Inderscience Publishers

SeReCon: a secure reconfiguration controller for self-reconfigurable systems

A risk of covert insertion of circuitry into reconfigurable computing (RC) systems exists. This paper reviews risks of hardware attack on field programmable gate array (FPGA)-based RC systems and proposes a method for secure system credentials generation (unique, random and partially anonymous) and trusted self-reconfiguration, using a secure reconfiguration controller (SeReCon) and partial reconfiguration (PR). SeReCon provides a root of trust (RoT) for RC systems, incorporating novel algorithms for security credentials generation and trusted design verification. Credentials are generated internally, during system certification. The private credential element never leaves the SeReCon security perimeter. To provide integrity-maintaining self-reconfiguration, SeReCon performs analysis of each new IP core structure prior to reconfiguration. An unverified IP core can be used provided that its spatial isolation is retained. SeReCon provides encrypted storage for installed IP cores. Resource usage for a prototype SeReCon system is presented. The protection provided by SeReCon is illustrated in a number of security attack scenarios.

Keywords: field programmable gate arrays, FPGA, partial reconfiguration, reconfigurable computing, trusted computing, critical embedded systems, design security, design assurance, design integrity, critical computing, self-, reconfiguration, reconfiguration control, hardware attacks

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